The title of Beth Shapiro’s ‘How to Clone a Mammoth’ contains an implicature: it suggests that it is indeed possible to clone a mammoth, to bring extinct species back from the dead. But in fact Shapiro both denies this is possible, and denies there would be good reason to do it even if it were possible. The de-extinct ‘mammoths’ she speaks of are merely ecological proxies for mammoths—elephants re-engineered for cold-tolerance by the addition to their genomes of a few (...) mammoth genes. Shapiro’s denial that genuine species de-extinction is possible is based on her assumption that resurrected organisms would need to be perfectly indistinguishable from the creatures that died out. In this article I use the example of an extinct New Zealand wattlebird, the huia, to argue—contra Shapiro—that there are compelling reasons to resurrect certain species if it can be done. I then argue—again, contra Shapiro—that synthetically created organisms needn’t be perfectly indistinguishable from their genetic forebears in order for species de-extinction to be successful. (shrink)

William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague. By William Joseph Gavin. Anti‐foundationalism Old and New. Edited by Tom Rockmore and Beth Singer.

On the traditional view, moral distress arises only in cases where an individual believes she knows the morally right thing to do but fails to perform that action due to various constraints. We seek to motivate a broader understanding of moral distress. We begin by presenting six types of distress that fall outside the bounds of the traditional definition and explaining why they should be recognized as forms of moral distress. We then propose and defend a new and more expansive (...) definition of moral distress and examine how it can enable the development of a taxonomy of moral distress. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that disability is typically a bad thing for those who are disabled. Our purpose in this essay is to critique this view and defend a more nuanced picture of the relationship between disability and well-being. We first examine four interpretations of the above view and argue that it is false on each interpretation. We then ask whether disability is thereby a neutral trait. Our view is that most disabilities are neutral in one sense, though we cannot (...) make simple generalizations about disability's relationship to well-being in other important senses. After defending this view, we discuss its practical implications for selective abortion for disability, nondisabled people's interactions with disabled people, and the use of QALYs in health policy. (shrink)

Recent museum practice has seen a return to ‘wonder’ as a governing principle for display and visitor engagement. Wonder has long been a contentious topic in aesthetics, literary studies, and philosophy of religion, but its adoption in the museum world has been predominantly uncritical. Here I will suggest that museums draw on a concept of wonder that is largely unchanged from seventeenth-century philosophy, yet without taking account of early modern doubts about wonder's efficacy for knowledge. In this paper I look (...) at Descartes' and Spinoza's views about wonder and the uses and disadvantages of wonder as a learning tool. This examination is extended to consider Descartes' and Spinoza's likely views about ‘museums’, in the sense of spaces that link objects both to feeling and to knowing. Finally, I suggest that there are resources in Spinoza's philosophy for bringing knowledge-enhancing feelings into the museum without resorting to the problematic concept of wonder. (shrink)

Suppose we believe that a property F is coextensive with moral permissibility. F may be, for example, the property of having the best consequences, if we are Consequentialists, or that of conforming to a universalisable maxim, if we are Kantians, and so on. This may raise the following problem. It is plausible that permissibility is “closed under implication”: any act that is implied by a permissible act must itself be permissible. Yet, in some cases, F might not be closed under (...) implication. If that is so, then F cannot be coextensive with permissibility. Maximalism has been proposed as a solution to this problem. A “maximal” act is one not implied by any other act. Maximalism restricts the claim that F is coextensive with permissibility to maximal acts only. A non-maximal act may be permissible without being F if it is implied by a maximal act that is F. The general aim of this paper is to investigate these issues by considering the formal structure of acts, or the “act-implication” relation. Discussions of Maximalism have tended to assume implicitly that acts have structure of some sort, but there has been little careful attention given to this structure. I aim to show that, by thinking about structure, we can provide a stronger defence of Maximalism. (shrink)

Ansel Adams, Robert Adams, Carlos Almaraz, Robert Arneson, John Baldessari, Lewis Baltz, Robert Bechtle, Jeff Brouws, Laurie Brown, Angela Buenning, Darlene Campbell, Mark Campbell, Gary Carlos, Fandra Chang, Stephane Couturier, Robert Dawson, Joe Deal, Richard Diebenkorn, John Divola, Beth Yarnelle Edwards, Kota Ezawa, William A. Garnett, Jeff Gillette, Joe Goode, Todd Hido, David Hockney, Salomon Huerta, Robert Isaacs, Thomas Lawson, Jean Lowe, Alex MacLean, Richard Meisinger, Jr., Richard Misrach, Rick Monzon, Barrie Mottishaw, Martin Mull, Deborah Oropallo, Bill (...) Owens, Rondal Partridge, John Register, Ed Ruscha, Peter Saul, Mary Snowden, Joel Sternfeld, Larry Sultan, Rudy Vanderlans, Camilo Jose Vergara, Henry Wessel, Amir Zaki. (shrink)

This thesis focuses on expressively rich languages that can formalise talk about probability. These languages have sentences that say something about probabilities of probabilities, but also sentences that say something about the probability of themselves. For example: (π): “The probability of the sentence labelled π is not greater than 1/2.” Such sentences lead to philosophical and technical challenges; but can be useful. For example they bear a close connection to situations where ones confidence in something can affect whether it is (...) the case or not. The motivating interpretation of probability as an agent's degrees of belief will be focused on throughout the thesis. -/- This thesis aims to answer two questions relevant to such frameworks, which correspond to the two parts of the thesis: “How can one develop a formal semantics for this framework?” and “What rational constraints are there on an agent once such expressive frameworks are considered?”. (shrink)

L’auteur cherche à montrer cru’un appel à l’évidence intuitive pour fonder les mathématiques n’est ni rejetable, ni évitable,. Cet appel à l’intuition nécessite un fondement subjectif des mathématiques à côté du fondement objectif.

How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the rest? Motivational Humeans hold that at least two attitudes are indispensable, belief and desire. Desire-As-Belief theorists beg to differ. They hold that the belief attitude can do the all the work the desire attitude is supposed to do, because desires are in fact nothing but beliefs of a certain kind. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy (...) of mind, with regards the problem of naturalizing the propositional attitudes, and for metaethics, with regards Michael Smith’s ‘moral problem’. This paper defends a version of Desire-As-Belief, and shows that it is immune to several major objections commonly levelled against such theories. (shrink)

Famous examples of conceivability arguments include (i) Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, (ii) Kripke's ‘modal argument’ against psychophysical identity theory, (iii) Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ against materialism, and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper, we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding ‘mirror argument’, M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C's conclusion. Hence, a proponent of C—henceforth, a ‘conceivabilist’—can be warranted in holding that C's premises (...) are conjointly true only if she can find fault with one of M's premises. But M's premises are modelled on a pair of C's premises. The same reasoning that supports the latter supports the former. For this reason, a conceivabilist can repudiate M's premises only on pain of severely undermining C's premises. We conclude on this basis that all conceivability arguments, including each of (i)–(iv), are fallacious. (shrink)

The idea of world government is returning to the mainstream of scholarly thinking about international relations. Will the world-government movement become a potent political force, or will it fade away as it did in the late 1940s?

Spending time alone is a virtually inevitable part of daily life that can promote or undermine well-being. Here, we explore how the language used to describe time alone – such as “me-time”, “solitude”, or “isolation” – influences how it is perceived and experienced. In Study 1 (N = 500 U.S adults), participants evaluated five common labels for time alone. Descriptive and narrative evidence revealed robust interindividual variability and significant mean differences in how these labels were evaluated. Overall, “me-time” was rated (...) most positively, and “isolation” was rated least positively (but not negatively). In Study 2, we experimentally manipulated the linguistic framing of time alone, describing it as either “me-time” or “isolation”. Participants (N = 176 U.S undergraduates) then spent 30 min physically alone without in-person or digital interaction. Notably, positive affect increased for “me-time” participants but decreased for “isolation” participants. Negative affect decreased in both conditions, but the magnitude of the decrease was greater after “me-time”. People’s beliefs about being alone improved after “me-time” but not after “isolation”. Further, we explored participants’ behaviours and thoughts while alone. These findings demonstrate meaningful variation in how people perceive different time alone labels and provide preliminary evidence that simple linguistic shifts may enhance subjective experiences of time alone. (shrink)

The aim of this book is “to point how far the Arabian philosophers succeeded in their attempt to integrate the Semitic and Muslim conception of revelation with Greek wisdom.” The problem is precisely that which confronted the Catholic theologians of the 13th century. Seeing the efforts of the Arabian philosophers side by side with the achievement of St. Thomas we can better appreciate what St. Thomas succeeded in doing.

This chapter reviews the problem of finding the 'right level' of causal explanation in psychiatry. This is not a purely philosophical problem, but one that frequently arises in practice for psychiatrists. For most scientists, experiment is the crucial test of a causal hypothesis: for X to cause Y is for intervention on X to be reflected in a change in the value of Y. But this kind of approach cannot tell us the right "level" at which to specify the causes (...) of a particular outcome. The natural idea is the right level is one that specifies the 'mechanism' by which Y is produced. But the notion of a "mechanism" in psychiatry is obviously problematic. This chapter attempts to locate the sources of the difficulty here, looking at both a priori and empirical views as to when a "mechanism" has been correctly specified. (shrink)

Research suggests that people with psychopathic traits experience fear-inducing stimuli differently from others, seeming to interpret fear as more positive and less negative. We expected that this reaction, termed fear enjoyment, would impact the effect of fear-inducing stimuli on self-report risk-taking behaviour. Risk-taking was measured before and after viewing excitement- and fear-inducing videos (N = 825). As expected from research showing that fear induction tends to reduce risk-taking tendencies, participants showed reduced risk-taking scores following a fear-inducing stimulus. Importantly, this relationship (...) was moderated by psychopathic traits. Participants who did not decrease their risk-taking tendencies following the video scored significantly higher on psychopathic traits. Also, some of the variance in the relationship between psychopathic traits and change in risk-taking was partly accounted for by fear enjoyment, suggesting that future research should examine whether fear enjoyment may play a role in the relationship between psychopathy and risk-taking. (shrink)

Artikkelen er en analyse av to formaliserte etiske retningslinjer som skal gjelde i norske akademiske institusjoner. Den ene er utarbeidet for forvaltningen og den andre for forskningen. Analysen gjøres ved å sammenligne to dokumenter som inneholder etiske retningslinjer. Videre knyttes analysen til ulike «etos» som skiller forvaltningen og forskningen. Artikkelen går særlig inn på normene lydighet og frihet, som framstår som mest motsetningsfylte når de «møtes» i akademia. Det drøftes hvordan dette påvirker legitimiteten til akademia.Nøkkelord: akademia, byråkrati, etos, forskningsetikk, forvaltningsetikkEnglish (...) summary: Ethics on a collision course – when bureaucratic ethics and research ethics meetThe article is an analysis of two formal ethical guidelines for Norwegian academic institutions. One is prepared for the governmental bureaucracy and the other is research ethics. The analysis is done by comparing two documents containing the code of conduct for each field. Further analysis is related to the differing «ethos» that separates the bureaucracy from the research. The article dwells on the norms of obedience and freedom that emerge as the most contradictory. The closing discussion is on how this affects the legitimacy of academia. (shrink)

Teenagers enjoy better physical and mental health when they avoid early sexual debut and reserve the sexual act for marriage. Teens who initiate sexual relations outside of marriage risk contracting sexually transmitted diseases, and those who also use hormonal contraception to avoid pregnancy often suffer unwanted physical and emotional side effects. Teens who have multiple partners may have later attachment or bonding difficulties. The consequences of an unintended pregnancy after a casual sexual relationship are often abortion or single motherhood and (...) an increased likelihood of poverty. Teenagers who save sexual relations for marriage experience freedom from these negative consequences and are more likely, in marriage, to experience the beauty of self-giving love. (shrink)

The Cove, Mine, and Food, INC. each use the documentary genre to advocate for change, whether in regards to mass wild animal kills, companion animals in natural disasters, or the modern food industry. The films, however, present views of human-nonhuman animal relations that vary greatly. Where The Cove regards dolphins as beings who deserve freedom, Mine explores the view of companion animals as property. Food, INC., finally, treats farm animals solely as a food source.

This chapter considers Adam Smith’s largely empirical methodology and the relationship between that and his normative moral views in the light of its importance for understanding his work and the assessment of the relevance of his approach to contemporary circumstances. This involves an analysis of Smith’s version of Newtonianism within his theory of moral systems, noting the importance of his deistic theological assumptions for the understanding of the symbiotic relationship between Smith’s explanatory and prescriptive enterprises. The relationship between Smith’s account (...) of utility and the moral sentiments is illustrated by reference to his theory of markets. (shrink)

In the light of what appear to be clear counterexamples, I argue that Jaegwon Kim’s comparative evaluation of functional reduction and reduction via necessary identities is problematic. I trace the problem to two sources: a misplaced metaphysical assumption about the explanatory role of identities and an excessively strong and narrow criterion for successful reductive explanation. Appreciating where Kim’s critique runs astray enhances our understanding of the role of necessary identities in reductive explanation.

Essays by Rudolf Bernoulli, Martin Buber, C. M. von Cammerloher, T. W. Danzel, Friedrich Heiler, C. G. Jung, C. Kerényi, John Layard, Fritz Meier, Max Pulver, Erwin Rousselle, and Heinrich Zimmer. With an introduction by Mircea Eliade.

Professor H. J. Rose's article in C.Q. xxxiii. 69 f. has advanced the study of this perplexing passage in two important respects. He has observed that, in order to determine the ‘eye’ as metaphorical, ỏΦθαλμός requires a dependent genitive, and he has therefore restored μεαλν πολων to this relation by punctuating as above instead of after πολίων And he is surely equally right in maintaining that this plural genitive must have a plural reference; it must mean ‘of great cities’ and (...) not ‘of Cyrene’. For although there is a figure called pluralis maiestatis, such obscurity in the use of it seems too affected, such ambiguity too perverse; a poem honouring the prince of Cyrene will refer to this famous city in unmistakable terms. (shrink)

Definitional slippage threatens to equate secondary sociopathy with mere criminality and leaves the status of noncriminal sociopaths ambiguous. Primary sociopathy appears to show more environmental contingency than would be implied by a strong genetic trait approach. A reinterpretation in terms of hypermasculinity and hypofemininity is compatible with the data.

In this paper I argue that human beings should reason, not in accordance with classical logic, but in accordance with a weaker ‘reticent logic’. I characterize reticent logic, and then show that arguments for the existence of fundamental Gödelian limitations on artificial intelligence are undermined by the idea that we should reason reticently, not classically.

Cultural effects can influence the results of causal genetic analyses, such as Mendelian randomisation, but the potential influences of culture on genotype–phenotype associations are not currently well understood. Different genetic variants could be associated with different phenotypes in different populations, or culture could confound or influence the direction of the association between genotypes and phenotypes in different populations.

In this paper, I consider how we ought to read the aspect‐perception passages in the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus (TLP) in the light of its ethics. I engage with a recent proposal, of Genia Schönbaumsfeld's, that we should replace the TLP account of aspect‐perception with that which Wittgenstein puts forward in the Philosophical Investigations (PI). I show that, far from helping us to grasp the ethical vision contained in the TLP, this proposal obscures it. I go on to draw some conclusions from (...) this as to how to read the TLP in its relation to Wittgenstein's other work. (shrink)

Freedom of speech and of the press have long been central rights within democratic polities, but there is little agreement as to their content, scope or justification. These essays take up fundamental issues concerning freedom of communication in general, and some controversial areas as well.